When does government end and campaigning begin? Brazil’s betting ban and the Electoral Court’s lens

A provisional measure published on 25 September 2026, nine days before Brazil’s first round, banned fixed-odds betting in the country and immediately raised a question that matters to high-risk operators: when does a policy announcement become campaign conduct? The answer is not just constitutional theory; it is about whether state machinery can be used to reinforce an election message.

1. On 25 September 2026, the Brazilian government published MP No. 1.394, which prohibited fixed-odds betting in Brazil. The timing matters because it came just nine days before the first round, in the middle of an active presidential campaign.
2. On the same day, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was running for re-election, took part in a campaign event in Recife and again argued for ending bets. He said that when he arrived in São Paulo he would take part in an official event to sign a measure aimed at ending betting. Hours later, the federal government held the official ceremony presenting the MP that did exactly that.
3. The article’s core point is not that any single act proves abuse of political power. Instead, the legally sensitive part is the sequence: campaign speech, presidential act, official ceremony, and institutional communication. When an election slogan becomes state policy within hours, the line between campaigning and governing gets very thin.
4. The messaging was not limited to the podium. The same policy was pushed through official channels, including a message sent from the verified GovBR account on WhatsApp, saying the measure “prohibits bets in Brazil” and giving instructions on withdrawal and reimbursement of funds.
5. There was an administrative reason to notify bettors: the MP created a short transition period, allowing voluntary withdrawals until 5 October, the day after the first round, and requiring platforms to become unavailable from 6 October. But the article draws a distinction that matters for regulators and PSPs: informing users is one thing, using public infrastructure for electoral gain is another.

The legal hook is article 22 of Complementary Law No. 64/1990, which allows an investigation into misuse, diversion, or abuse of authority in favor of a candidacy. Under the TSE’s case law, the key test is the seriousness of the circumstances, not mathematical proof that the conduct changed the election result. For payment providers, the useful takeaway is simpler: in Brazil, a politically timed enforcement move can create not only operational risk for betting flows, but also electoral-law scrutiny around how the state message was packaged and delivered.