ICIJ says A7A5 routed $14 billion in cash through a ruble-backed stablecoin network from November 2024 to July 2025

According to an ICIJ investigation with Russian journalists, the A7 network processed 283 tons of cash rubles from November 2024 through July 2025, with monthly volume reaching 58 tons at peak. For PSPs, acquirers, and banks, the point is not the headline number on its own but the mechanics: cash collection, bank settlement, stablecoin conversion, and cross-border payouts tied to sanctioned or high-risk flows.

1. ICIJ says the network handled about 126 billion rubles over six peak days in November-December 2024. By April 2025, monthly volume had reached 195 billion rubles, and by June it had risen to 250 billion rubles.
2. The journalists say the cash was often collected through Moscow retail markets, including “Sadovod,” where at least eight groups of intermediaries were operating. They accepted cash rubles and payment instructions, with importers using that setup to pay for shipments from abroad.
3. From there, the cash was reportedly packed into numbered bags and taken to A7’s cash center, then sent to Promsvyazbank, A7’s founder, where the rubles were placed into storage. A7 accounts were then credited with matching amounts, after which the rubles were exchanged into stablecoins for foreign settlements.
4. ICIJ says the network then used a chain of subagents registered outside Russia, most often in China, Hong Kong, and Kyrgyzstan, to transfer funds to foreign recipients, mainly Chinese suppliers. The investigation says A7A5, the ruble stablecoin, was what allowed the network to convert and route funds while obscuring their cash and Russian origin.
5. In early October, the UK imposed sanctions on financial services it said helped the A7 network evade sanctions. On 1 October, the US Treasury said A7 was a “shadow banking structure” used by Iran to evade sanctions, while OFAC designated A7 as a “significant transnational criminal organization.”