Multi-accounting has become a fraud gateway in Brazil’s iGaming market

What used to look like bonus hunting has turned into one of the main fraud vectors in Brazilian iGaming. For PSPs, acquirers, and operators, the problem is not just duplicate sign-ups; it is the resale of verified accounts and the way that structure breaks KYC controls after onboarding.

1. Multi-accounting means keeping more than one active account on the same platform, either in the same person’s name or under different identities controlled by that person, to get an advantage the bookmaker would not allow through a single registration.
2. The motivations range from repeating welcome bonuses to bypassing stake limits after a winning streak. The more organized schemes go further: cross betting, where different accounts bet opposite outcomes of the same event to lock in a gain whatever happens, and collusion between players to manipulate collective games.
3. The structural problem in Brazil is the parallel market for already verified accounts. In this setup, a person called a drop or laranja is paid to open an account in their own name, provide documents, and pass identity verification, including facial recognition. Once the account is verified, it is resold at a much higher price to banned bettors or to users whose limits were reduced on other platforms.
4. This inverts the logic of KYC (Know Your Customer). The identity check is completed correctly at onboarding by the document holder, but the platform loses control later when someone else takes over the account and the operator has no direct way to detect that transfer.
5. For operators, the impact is straightforward: coordinated betting across multiple accounts distorts odds by creating the appearance of organic market behavior where there is really one centralized strategy, and it inflates customer acquisition costs because welcome bonuses are paid repeatedly to the same person or organized group.

Brazilian regulation already gives operators a response in confirmed fraud cases. Under Portaria SPA/MF nº 1.231/2024, article 55 allows the operator, after a confirmed fraud-related account closure, to retain the amount deposited by the bettor up to the limit of the damages caused, which means the operator needs enough traceability to justify the decision. Portaria SPA/MF nº 722/2024 also sets out specific technical requirements for dealing with this type of abuse.