Pakistan’s FIA says a Rs120 billion gambling network used 11 companies, branchless accounts, and USDT

Pakistan’s FIA has arrested two suspects in a case tied to an online gambling network that, investigators say, moved money through 11 companies and a web of bank channels. For PSPs, acquirers, and sponsoring banks, the useful part is not the headline number; it is the mechanics: shell storefronts, clustered beneficial owners, branchless accounts, and payouts that split across traditional rails and crypto.

1. The FIA says the scheme was built for a Chinese partner described as an international agent for gambling platforms. According to the investigation, two accused men proposed a local payment setup in Pakistan and routed gambling traffic through businesses that looked ordinary on paper.
2. The structure used 11 companies, and 8 of them were registered to just three people. The combined credit turnover of those eight entities exceeded Rs105 billion, or about $380 million. One of the arrested suspects allegedly owned three companies with turnover of around Rs47,78 billion, or about $173 million.
3. The storefronts were presented as e-commerce, digital marketing, and construction businesses. The second arrested suspect allegedly built dummy websites and helped “test” them during corporate payment account onboarding. That is the part PSPs know too well: a polished site can get you through the door, while the traffic tells a different story.
4. Five branchless accounts reportedly received about Rs8,6 billion, or about $31 million, across roughly 10,5 million transactions. That works out to an average payment of around Rs820, or about $3, which is the kind of micro-ticket pattern that can hide in plain sight when it is spread across “normal” merchant accounts.
5. Investigators say the funds moved through several banking channels to other accounts, with some settlements allegedly passing through hawala and USDT. The same report says the participants earned Rs100–450 million, or about $0,36–1,6 million, over a year, though that has not been proven.

For high-risk payment teams, the signal is straightforward: this was not a single suspicious MID, but a cluster built to look mundane at every step. The practical checks are familiar too — beneficial owner linkage across entities, traffic-versus-business consistency, and monitoring for account behavior that looks nothing like the declared merchant profile.